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I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) has facilitated the resolution of international trade
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disputes among and between states. Often, however, states handle international
trade disputes on behalf of private entities which are the real parties in interest to
a dispute. In an increasingly interdependent global economy, companies and
individuals, not states, are the primary vehicles for conducting international trade.2
Therefore, what protections, if any, does the GATT provide to insure that the real
parties in interest to international trade disputes have the right to seek a remedy?
Strictly speaking, the GATT is not open to non-state individuals for the purpose of
seeking resolution of international trade disputes. In practice, however, states have
generally been willing to bring disputes under the GATT on behalf of their private
national entities. Nevertheless, the ultimate decision to bring, litigate and settle a
trade dispute lies with the state rather than the individual.
Recently, two issues in private 'party access, outlined in World Trade
Organization (WTO) decisions, suggest that dispute resolution in the WTO may be
moving away from a solely governmental focus. First, the WTO asserted the right
of member states to include private, non-governmental employees in their trade
delegations before the WTO,4 an historically forbidden practice. Second, the WTO
has also acknowledged the right of private individuals or organizations to submit
amicus briefs in support of their positions in international trade disputes to which
they are not a party.5
Increased liberalization of private party access to international trade dispute
settlement proceedings has the potential to bestow several benefits on global
international trade. Most importantly, private access to the WTO could
acknowledge the inherently private nature of international trade as it is conducted
in the modern era. In turn, such acknowledgment could potentially reduce the
problems of political capture and democracy deficit, which are only left unchecked
in the absence of private participation in trade dispute settlement. Likewise, private
access to the WTO stands to improve the legal transparency of international trade
and dispute settlement.
Private party access to international trade organizations is also important
because of the need for state accountability. State accountability to individuals in
1. "States" herein refers to the member nations that are "Contracting Parties" to the GATr, now members
of the WTO.
2. See Susan Strange, States, Firms, and Diplomacy, INT'L AFFAiRs, London, Vol. 68, no.1, (1992).
3. See, e.g., United States-Anti-Dumping Duty on DRAMs of One Megabit or Above From Korea,
WT/DS99/R [hereinafter United States Anti-Dumping Duty]. South Korea brought an action before the WTO on
behalf of South Korean producers of DRAMS (Dynamic Random Access Memory chips) including Hyundai
Electronics Industries and LG Semicon; European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution
of Bananas, infra note 4, where the United States brought an action before the WTO on behalf of U.S. banana
growers including Chiquita Brands Int'l, Inc.
4. See European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas-Recourse
to Arbitration by the European Communities Under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WTO doc. WT/DS27/ARB (Apr. 9,
1999) [hereinafter European Communities-Regime for Importation].
5. See United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, infra note 66, at 15-22
(holding that amicus briefs may now be sent directly to the WTO without attachment to members' submissions).
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international trade disputes is important in that substantive and procedural rights in
international law are not mutually exclusive. For example, even if individuals are
accorded substantive rights under a system of dispute settlement, a lack of
procedural access to the dispute settlement system obviates the significance and
effectiveness of those rights. Thus, the ability of private parties to receive both
substantive and procedural rights in international trade dispute settlement is
indispensable in insuring state accountability for state actions in the arena of
international trade.
This paper will begin with a discussion of the background of the GATT in the
context of its state-centric foundation. The background discussion will also include
several political theories that contributed to the establishment of the GAIT and that
make its implementation more difficult. Following the background discussion, this
paper will discuss recent WTO decisions addressing private access to international
dispute resolution forums. It will then analyze whether these decisions represent
endemic changes to the WTO system in the form of increasingly liberalized access
for private parties. Integral to this analysis is the discussion of other systems of
international dispute resolution that provide open venues for private party disputes
and the relationship between their structures to that of the WTO.
In conclusion, this paper will acknowledge the structural hindrances within the
WTO that ultimately prevent full private access to dispute settlement proceedings.
However, this is not to diminish the significance of the progress cited herein. These
decisions provide small contributions to an ultimate goal of unencumbered private
party representation at the WTO. The greater question to be answered in this paper
is whether, in light of the recent WTO holdings, future concessions permitting
further private party access to the WTO can be expected. Above all else, it remains
doubtful that WTO case law can fully establish the right of private parties to bring
trade disputes before the WTO. The WTO system that truly reflects the liberal
nature of global international trade, not bound by national borders, can only be
established through sweeping structural changes.
I. BACKGROUND
A. History of the GATT
The structure of the GATT is a reflection of the circumstances which
surrounded its inception. The International Trade Organization (ITO) was created
when the Bretton Woods Agreements were signed following World War II for the
purpose of regulating international trade.6 The United States refused to join the ITO
because of "perceived threats to national sovereignty and the danger of too much
6. See Rubens Ricupero, Secretary-General of UNCTAD. Statement at the Second Ministerial Conference
of the WTO, May 18-19, 1998.
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ITO intervention in markets."7 Without U.S. participation, the ITO never came into
existence.8 International trade has operated since that time, by default, under the
GAIT. The GATT was also signed at Bretton Woods and was designed to act as a
temporary substitute in lieu of the ITO system.9 Although the GAIT lacked a
formal institutional structure because of its temporary nature, the GAIT has
nevertheless promoted and enhanced the liberalization of worldwide international
trade for more than fifty years.'0 Perhaps an additional result of its "interim" nature,
the GATT, by design, has operated under the, 'albeit faulty, premise that
international trade disputes are solely between states.
The GATT framework is a reflection of the prevailing theories of international
trade that predominated at the time of the Bretton Woods Agreements. The
traditional structure of international trade, that is, the degree of openness for the
movement of goods as opposed to the other factors of production, can be explained
by realist state-power theory. The realist state-power theory assumes that the
interests and powers of states acting to maximize national goals determines the
structure of international trade." In contrast, following World War II, the
international trade system that emerged at Bretton Woods had a broader conception
of the traditional international economic order. This order of international economic
relations facilitated the creation of international institutional and regulatory
frameworks.
In the early years of the GAIT, the contracting parties handled disputes by
acting jointly orby setting up working groups of diplomatic representatives
to investigate complaints. In 1955 ... the GATT Secretariat established
dispute resolution panels of three to five experts to act as independent
arbitrators to facilitate dispute resolution. [From] 1955 until 1995, the
GATT system gradually grew more 'legalistic' and professional, but it
remained formally nonbinding.'
2
While Bretton Woods stepped away from the state-power theory through the
establishment of an international trade rule of law, the GATT remained devoid of
appropriate enforcement mechanisms.
The non-legally binding nature of the GAIT, which assumes states will comply
only when it is in their self-interest to do so, results from the realist theory and a
7. Michael R. Czinkita, Executive Insights: The World Trade Organization-Perspectives and Prospects,
3 J. INT'L MARKETING 85 (1995).
8. See id.
9. See R. Bruno, Access of Private Parties to International Dispute Settlement: A Comparative Analysis,
155 (1995) (unpublished L.L.M. thesis, Harvard University) (on file with the author).
10. See id.
11. Seeid.
12. See id.
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reluctance to shed state-power. 3 The GAIT framework is thus a reflection of state
power and the belief thatit is states, not individuals, who are subject to international
law.14 As a result, the GAT has been subject to the politically-based considerations
of state self-interest, rather than rule-of-law enforcement.
The creation of the WTO through the 1994 Uruguay Round Agreements
successfully altered the GATr system into a more rule-based structure. In
particular, the transparency of trade dispute resolution was greatly enhanced by the
establishment of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes (the DSU).'5 Nevertheless, the WTO dispute resolution
system, as embodied by the DSU, has retained much of the state-oriented focus of
the GATT.16 As discussed below, there are many dangers to a state-oriented
international trade dispute resolution system that does not proportionately give
access to individuals who conduct international trade. The following is a discussion
of the theoretical background behind those dangers.
B. Political Capture
One of the excesses that private party access to the WTO can prevent is the
problem of political capture. Capture theory posits an organization run by
individuals who try to maximize their own interests.17 In the context of a domestic
organization, the members attempt to maximize a private, rather than public, utility
function. 8 In the context of the international system, and in the case of the WTO,
the organization is instead "run" by states who are seeking to maximize their own
interests. Capture theory asserts a cyclical relationship between the states that are
members of the WTO and the interests promoted by that organization. 19 In other
words, so long as it is only states that are parties to the WTO, the only interests that
can be adequately represented and reflected are those of states. On the other hand,
private participation in international organizations can help break the cycle of state
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade
Organization, 44 DUKE LJ. 829, 834 (1995).
16. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-Multinational Trade Negotiations (The Uruguay Rounds
Agreement Establishing the Multinational Trade Organization [World Trade Organization]), Dec. 15, 1993, art. II
11, 33 I.L.M. 13, 15 [hereinafter WTO Agreement]. The WTO Agreement states, in pertinent part, "[the [WTO]
shall provide the common institutional framework for the conduct of trade relations among its Members."
(emphasis added); see id. art. XII 1 1. Membership in the WTO is limited to either states or separate customs
territories; see i. art XI 1 1. The contracting parties to the GATr when the WTO Agreement entered into force
are considered original members of the WTO. Id.
17. Take, for example, the hazardous waste industry. High-level EPA regulators and other officials leave
government positions and find high-level jobs in the same industry that they had been responsible forregulating.
18. See HORWlZ, THE IRONY OFREGULATORY REFORM, 36 (1989).
19. For example, one may argue that WTO Panels and Appellate Bodies consist of individuals formerly
employed by member states in the area of international trade and who may have represented their respective states'
interests in that capacity.
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interest perpetuated by political capture. In her article addressing individual rights
in international trade organizations, Andrea Schneider discusses the link between
domestic politics and international trade:
The involvement of private actors in the dispute resolution mechanisms of
trade organizations has the ability to reduce the linkage between trade and
domestic political interests. While theoretically this link allows
governments to be more responsive to their citizens, in reality, the link
between trade and politics keeps governments tethered to special and well-
organized interest groups. Once a state has determined that it is in its
national interest to join a trade organization and once rules are adopted
under that organization, the link to domestic political interests can be
reduced by giving private actors standing to enforce the agreement. In that
way governments will be responsible for following the rules across the
board rather than selectively.20
Thus, private party access to the WTO can help improve state accountability to the
companies and individuals who conduct international trade. In contrast, the lack of
private access to the WTO leads to political capture at the international level.
C. Democracy Deficit
The theory of democracy deficit argues that as power is centralized in an
organization or government, and as increasing numbers of laws are passed,
individuals have less ability to influence the actions of the organization or
government. 2' At the WTO, the lack of access for private parties to dispute
resolution mechanisms may be more appropriately termed, "democracy absence."
Indeed, the lack of any legitimate participation in the WTO holds corporations,
NGO's and public interest groups at a great disadvantage with respect to states'
ability to influence trade policies. This problem is compounded atthe WTO because
it is precisely those mentioned private entities who are most affected by trade
policy.
Thus, democracy deficit is exacerbated at the WTO in the absence of private
party participation. Most of the time, and in most states, member governments of
the WTO make a concerted effort to adequately represent private parties before the
WTO, much in the same way a benevolent king "chooses" to heed the needs of his
subjects. In the same way, however, that a king may choose not to cooperate with
20. Andrea K. Schneider, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: Individual Rights in International Trade
Organizations, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 587, 594 (1998) (citations omitted).
21. Id. at 591.
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his subjects' desires, so too may a member government to the WTO choose not to
represent any interests other than its own.
Democracy deficit is problematic both with respect to state accountability and
to the conduct of international trade among private parties. A state's capacity to act
at will and subject its trade policies to political, rather than economic,
environmental and other concerns, lessens the effectiveness or applicability of the
WTO. More importantly, however, it is the lack of transparency in international
trade policy that contributes most to the problem of democracy deficit.
D. Transparency
Transparency is an important aspect of any international system. It is important
because "clear rules set forth how the system is going to work and create
confidence on the part of users of the system."22 A low level of transparency exists
if rules and procedures are not well-established in advance of a dispute. In that case,
"resolution is left up to the parties, and no system is set forth."' ' On the other hand,
a high level of transparency is achieved when procedures and decisions of a system
are published regularly to create a high level of predictability.24
Initially, transparency in the WTO was mainly concerned with the right to be
informed. Thus, NGOs long complained that they could not examine written
submissions to panels and could not see panel reports until adoption. Transparency,
however, is also about the right to inform and otherwise participate in the
adjudicative process. NGOs now want to make written submissions to panels and
to attend their meetings. "Clearly, both the right to inform and to be informed (and
thus to participate in the adjudicative process) are both important aspects of
transparency."5
The European Union (EU) is, perhaps, the most transparent of international
systems,26 and although the WTO has made great progress towards achieving
predictability and transparency through the establishment of the DSU and regularly
published decisions, there is nevertheless an inherent problem in its transparency
potential.27 Unlike the EU, there is no direct effect of the WTO which gives rise to
private access to dispute resolution systems. Instead, the WTO is accountable to
individual interests in a merely precatory fashion. The WTO lacks transparency
because private parties in the form of individuals, corporations and NGOs can never
be sure of a position that a state will endorse before the WTO. Notwithstanding the
22. Schneider, supra note 20, at 614.
23. ld. at 615.
24. Id. at 616.
25. P. Clark & P. Morrison, Key Procedural Issues: Transparency, 32 INT'L LAW. 851, 857 (1998).
26. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
27. See id.
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influential benefits of lobbying, private parties are otherwise helpless in affecting
trade policy under the WTO rules.
Treaty enforcement, or lack thereof, stands as another bar to a system's
transparency. The Uruguay Round Negotiations made great strides toward
advancing the enforcement of WTO decisions and rulings. 28 The Uruguay Round
did little, however, to improve the access of private parties to international trade
disputes.29 In this way, the Uruguay Round failed to dissolve the final bar to
adequate transparency in the WTO.
III. THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE COUNSEL: THE BANANAS CASE
In September, 1997, the WTO Appellate Body handed down its decision in
European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of
Bananas, (EU-Bananas) ° That case addressed the issue of the legality, under
WTO rules, of the EU's preferential treatment of bananas imported from ACP
States.3 ' The EU regime, replacing the former national market organizations
established by individual member states to ensure the development of the banana
industry in ACP countries, recognized that banana production was vital for the
economic stability of these countries because it provided up to seventy percent of
total export earnings.3 2 The parties complaining against the EU regime were
Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and the United States (the "Complaining
Parties"). 33 United States participation in this case was strongly urged by Ohio-
based Chiquita, who, like Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico, stood to lose
market share and profits due to the EU-ACP arrangement.
34
The Appellate Body ruled in favor of the Complaining Parties, determining that
the EU's practices governing the banana trade were inconsistent with its obligations
under the GATT 1994.35 More specifically, the EU practices cited as inconsistent
with WTO rules included assigning import licenses for ACP origin bananas to
French and British companies and imposing "more burdensome" licensing
requirements for imports from the Latin American co-complainants than for other
28. See generally Shell, supra note 15.
29. See WTO Agreement, supra note 16, art. Hl 1, 33 I.L.M. at 15.
30. WT/DS27/AB/R Sept. 9, 1997.
31. The "ACP States" are the African, Caribbean, and Pacific States which are signatories to the Lom6
Convention of 1989 with the EC. According to EC Regulation 404/93, twelve states have traditionally exported
bananas to the European Union: C6te D'Ivoire, Cameroon, Suriname, Somalia, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent
and the Grenadines, Dominica, Belize, Cape Verde, Grenada, and Madagascar.
32. Hallam & Peston, The Political Economy of Europe's Banana Trade, Occasional Paper No. 5,
Department of Agriculture and Food Economics, University of Redding, Jan. 1997.
33. WT/DS27/AB/R, supra note 30, at 1.
34. R. Sekhri, Chiquita's Battle Over EU Practices May Hurt Retailers, BUS. COURIER, Nov. 30, 1998;
see generally United States-Anti-Dumping Duty, supra note 3.
35. WT/DS27/AB/R, supra note 30, at 255.
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countries' bananas. 36 Under the DSU of the WTO, the EU was given a "reasonable"
period of time within which to bring its practices into compliance with the
decision.37 Whether the EU properly implemented the appellate body decision
remains in dispute.38
A. Private Counsel Representation
As a procedural matter in the EU-Bananas case, the Panel report denied Saint
Lucia's request for representation by two private legal advisers who were not full-
time employees of the government of Saint Lucia.39 In its first substantive meeting
with the parties on September 10, 1996, the Panel ruled that the private counsel
seeking to represent Saint Lucia was not entitled to attend the Panel's meetings in
the case.4°
The Panel ruling with respect to denying representation by private counsel was
not specifically appealed to the Appellate Body.41 Nevertheless, in July 1997, the
government of Saint Lucia submitted a letter to the Appellate Body, again
requesting the participation of its two non-governmental legal advisers.42 In support
of its request, Saint Lucia submitted that, as a matter of customary international
law, a sovereign's right to decide whom it may'accredit as officials and members
of its delegation cannot be limited.43 "Furthermore, Saint Lucia noted that neither
the DSU nor the Working Procedures" deals with the issue of a sovereign state's
entitlement to appoint its delegation or accredit persons as full and proper
representatives of its government.45 Canada and Jamaica supported Saint Lucia's
36. Id.
37. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter DSU], Annex 2. (Article 21(3)(c)
of the DSU provides that, "if it is impracticable to comply immediately with the recommendations and
rulings .... [t]he reasonable period of time [for implementation] shall... not exceed fifteen months from the date
of adoption of a panel or Appellate Body report." The fifteen month period can be extended under certain
circumstances).
38. See The Economy Trade War Exposes Old Trade Divisions, (BBC News Online Network, Mar. 5,
1999); see also European Communities-Regime for the Importation, supra note 4 (finding injury to the U.S. in
the amount of $191.4 million per year).
39. See European Communities-Regime for Importation, supra note 4. Saint Lucia is an ACP state and
a third party participant to the case.
40. Il
41. Id.; see also DSU, supra note 37. Note that Saint Lucia is a third party to the case and that pursuant
to Articles 16.4 and 17.4 of the DSU, only parties to a dispute, and not third parties, may appeal a Panel Report.
42. See WT/DS27/AB/R, supra note 30, at 5.
43. See id.
44. "Working Procedures" refers to the Working Procedures for Appellate Review under the DSU,
Appendix 3 to the DSU. See DSU, supra note 37, at sec. 3.
45. See WT/DS27/AB/R, supra note 30, at 5.
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arguments. 46 Both countries argued that "it is the Member's right to authorize those
individuals it considers necessary or appropriate to represent its interests."4 7
The Complaining Parties supported the Panel's ruling before the Appellate
Body.m The Complaining Parties argued that, historically, "presentations by
governments in dispute settlement proceedings [under the GATI] have been made
exclusively by government lawyers or government trade experts." '49 In recognition
of developing-country member needs for representation by competent counsel, the
Complaining Parties cited Article 27.2 of the DSU which entitles such states to
legal assistance from the WTO Secretariat. 0 Lastly, the Complaining Parties cited
policy reasons, including ethics, conflicts of interest, and confidentiality, in favor
of denying private counsel representation.5'
On July 15, 1997, a mere six days after Saint Lucia's letter submission, the
Appellate Body granted Saint Lucia's request. The Appellate Body stated that there
was nothing in the WTO agreement, the DSU, the Working Procedures, nor in
customary international law or the prevailing practice of international tribunals
which (1) prevents a WTO member from composing its own delegation to an
Appellate Body proceeding, and (2) specifies who can represent a government in
making its representations before the Appellate Body.5 2 The Appellate Body also
noted that, in the interest of member governments' representation by qualified
counsel in Appellate Body proceedings, "representation by counsel of a
government's own choice may well be a matter of particular
significance-especially for developing-country Members-to enable them to
participate fully in dispute settlement proceedings.5 3
The Appellate Body ruling in the EU-Bananas case expressly permits
governmental representation by private counsel in oral hearings before the
Appellate Body. However, the Appellate Body noted that the peculiar legal nature
of its own proceedings, which permit the participation of private counsel, do.not
apply as fully at the panel level.-" Nevertheless, at least two panel decisions since
the EU-Bananas case have reportedly allowed private counsel to participate in oral
hearings.5
46. See id. at 6.
47. See id.
48. See id. at 9.
49. See id.
50. See id.; see also DSU, supra note 37, art. 27.2 ("While the Secretariat assists members in respect of
dispute settlement at their request, there may also be a need to provide additional legal advice and assistance in
respect of dispute settlement to developing country Members . .
51. See WT/DS27/AB/R, supra note 30, at 9.
52. See id. at I10, 12.
53. See id. at 112.
54. Peter Lichtenbaum, Procedural Issues in WTO Dispute Resolution, 19 MICH. . INT'L L. 1195, 1205
(1998).
55. See notes 58-59, infra notes and accompanying text (referring to Indonesia-Autos and the Bananas III
Panels).
The Transnational Lawyer/ Vol. 12
Most recently, in Indonesia-Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile
Industry (Indonesia-Autos), the government of Indonesia declared that its
delegation included two private lawyers not permanently employed by the
Indonesian government. 6 The United States argued that Indonesia's private counsel
should be barred from the Panel meetings. In a preliminary ruling on this issue, the
Panel rejected the U.S. request and stated:
We conclude it is for the Government of Indonesia to nominate the
members of its delegation to meetings of this panel, and we find no
provision in the WTO Agreement or the DSU, including the standard rules
of procedure included therein, which prevents a WTO member from
determining the composition of its delegation to WTO panel meetings. Nor
does past practice in GATT and WTO dispute settlement point us to a
different conclusion in this case. In particular, we note that unlike in this
present case, the working procedures of the Bananas III panel contained a
specific provision requiring the presence only of government officials.
7
Following the Indonesia-Autos and EU-Bananas decisions, the Office of the
United States Trade Representative (USTR) advocated for the disallowance of
private counsel representation at Panel hearings. 8 The USTR argued that the
dangers of permitting participation of private counsel may be that arguments in
trade disputes will be taken to extremes because private counsel will not appreciate
both sides of a dispute.5 9 Whereas a government may be reluctant to take a certain
position if it knows that such a position could be adverse to its interests in another
or future dispute, private counsel would not be subject to the same constraints.
In an attempt to persuade the U.S. government to change its position (as
articulated by the USTR) the American Bar Association (ABA) recommended that
WTO dispute resolution procedures permit all parties to be represented by counsel
of their selection, including non-government personnel. 60 The ABA supports its
recommendation with three main arguments: (1) absent rules to the contrary, under
international law, sovereign states are free to choose their representatives to
international organizations, (2) no international dispute settlement tribunals, except
for Chapter Twenty of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), limit
a member country's choice of counsel, and (3) the policy concerns surrounding
56. Report of the Panel Indonesia-Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, WTO
doc. WT/DS54/R (July 2, 1998) at 4.1.
57. See id. at 14.1, cited in Lichtebaum, supra note 54, at 1205-06.
58. Id. at 1206 (citing the statements of a USTR official at an International Law Association Conference,
New York, N.Y., Nov. 1997).
59. Id.
60. ABA Recommendation 118A (Feb. 2, 1998).
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private counsel participation can be curtailed without excluding such individuals
from proceedings. 61
Notwithstanding the U.S. aversion to state representation by private counsel at
the WTO, recent case law upholds the right of member governments to choose the
composition of their trade dispute settlement delegations. WTO Panels and the
Appellate Body have both recognized the futility, in the resolution of modem
international trade disputes, of maintaining strictly government-employed
delegations. The legacy of the procedural holding in the EU-Bananas case allows
a government to choose its own representatives.
B. Is There a Need for Private Counsel Representation?
Although a WTO (or GATT) member "has always been free to seek private
legal counsel in a dispute settlement case for its own internal matters," confusion
exists as to what duties such counsel may perform as a representative of a
government before the WTO.62 Historically, GATT and WTO proceedings
primarily have consisted of recitations of written material prepared in advance.63
"Typically, no brilliant oral exchanges between top legal minds on the finer points
of WTO law take place.., the possibility of having specialized legal counsel in the
panel room has not, up to now, been seen as a great advantage." 6 If private counsel
can complete most of the important work in a WTO case before the case goes
before a tribunal, why is the issue of private counsel representation important?
Unlike the larger members of the WTO, small member states require extensive
legal support from private, non-governmental attorneys in WTO proceedings.
Unlike larger members, smaller members were, in the past, unable to rely on such
representation before a WTO panel or Appellate Body.65 On the one hand, the
procedural decision in the EU-Bananas case makes a statement in support of the
national sovereignty of WTO members to determine, on their own, their delegations
to WTO proceedings. On the other hand, the decision recognizes the distinctly
international (rather than national) character of trade disputes. If, as described
above, private counsel have historically made important contributions to WTO
delegations absent the ability to participate in tribunal proceedings, their bar from
Panel and Appellate Body proceedings is unnecessary. In permitting WTO
members to include private counsel in their delegations, the WTO has
acknowledged that international trade disputes are not strictly state-to-state battles.
61. See id. Report accompanying Recommendation 118A ("Private Counsel in WTO Dispute Settlement
Proceedings").
62. Clark & Morrison, supra note 25, at 859.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. This refers to the pre- EU-Bananas case atmosphere that restricted non-governmental attorneys from
panel and appellate body proceedings.
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C. Submission of Briefs by NGOs: The Shrimp-Turtle Decision
In United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products in
1998, the WTO Appellate Body addressed the procedural issue of private or non-
member organizations' submission of briefs in WTO proceedings.66 This issue arose
in the context of the environmental ramifications of international trade. In the
Shrimp-Turtles decision, the WTO Appellate Body upheld an earlier WTO Panel
decision requiring the U.S. to bring its import practices with respect to shrimp into
conformity with WTO obligations. 67 The dispute arose out of the efforts by the
United States to prevent the importation of shrimp caught in nets that endanger sea
turtles. In 1989, the U.S. enacted Public Law 101-162, Section 609, which states
that the U.S. will not permit the importation of shrimp caught in nets that do not
employ turtle-excluder devices, or TED's.6' In 1996, the U.S. began enforcing the
provisions of Section 609 against all imported shrimp on a shipment-by-shipment
basis to determine whether the shrimp were caught in nets containing TED's.
69
Four Asian countries7" sought assistance from the WTO. They asserted that
Section 609 was a discriminatory law and that the U.S. had no right to mandate its
own domestic policy on other member states.71 At issue in both the Panel and
Appellate Body decisions in the Shrimp-Turtles was whether the enactment of
Section 609, a violation of Article XI of the GATr, was justified under Article XX
of the GAT. 7 In the end, the Appellate Body determined that, although Section
609 may fit an appropriate exception under Article XX(g), as a measure relating to
the conservation of exhaustible natural resources, it was applied in an "arbitrary and
discriminatory" manner. As such, it is a violation of the introduction, or chapeau,
of Article XX.
73
On the face of the Appellate Body decision, it appears as though GATT
interpretation favors the interests of free trade over environmental interests, such
as the protection of endangered species. The decision leaves certain species of sea
turtles in grave danger of extinction. In deciding that the U.S. was in violation of
GATT rules, however, the WTO Appellate Body carefully explained what it was
not deciding:
66. WTO Appellate Body, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
WT/DS581AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter Shrimp-Turtles].
67. Id. at 76.
68. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1537 (1989). TED's sit in the necks of shrimpers' nets and divert large creatures out,
while keeping smaller crustaceans.
69. See Shrimp-Turtles, supra note 66, at 6.
70. India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand.
71. See Shrimp-Turtles, supra note 66, at 1.
72. Article XX(b) provides an exception to GATr Article X's General Elimination of Quantitative
Restrictions, in the case that restrictive measures are "necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health."
73. The chapeau of Article XX provides, in relevant part, that exceptions are "[s]ubject to the requirement
that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries .... "
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We have not decided that the protection and preservation of the
environment is of no significance to the Members of the WTO. Clearly, it
is. We have not decided that the sovereign nations that are Members of the
WTO cannot adopt effective measures to protect endangered species, such
as sea turtles. Clearly, they can and should. And we have not decided that
sovereign states should not act together bilaterally, plurilaterally or
multilaterally, either within the WTO or in other international fora, to
protect endangered species or to otherwise protect the environment.
Clearly, they should and do.74
Nevertheless, the WTO decision in Shrimp-Turtles does little to protect certain
endangered species of sea turtles from extinction, and as such, it is strongly opposed
by countless private and NGO groups.75 Notwithstanding the decision, these groups
continue to fight worldwide for the protection of sea turtles. Because of the Shrimp-
Turtles decision, however, these same parties now have the right to bring their fight,
in the form of amicus briefs, directly to the WTO.
D. Private Party Submission of Briefs to the WTO
In the Shrimp-Turtles decision, and for the first time in the history of the
GATr, private party voices were officially given an ear at the WTO. NGO's,
especially those interested in environmental issues, historically argued for improved
access to the dispute settlement proceedings of the WTO, "knowing that
governments rarely capture their interests when representing the state's interest in
settling a trade dispute."76 Thus, prior to Shrimp-Turtles, an NGO with an interest
in protecting an area of the environment, such as marine life, from the potentially
destructive consequences of a trade dispute, could only exercise the option of
persuading a WTO member involved in a dispute to include its arguments in the
member's submissions to the WTO tribunal.77
Despite the absence of mechanisms for private party submission of briefs to the
WTO, three groups of NGOs submitted briefs to the Panel in the Shrimp-Turtle
decision in the hopes that their positions would influence the Panel.78 The Panel
found that the acceptance of non-requested information from non-governmental
74. Shrimp-Turtles, supra note 66, at 185.
75. See, e.g., National Wildlife Federation, WTO Panel Strikes Down U.S. Turtle Protection Law for the
Last Time (visited Nov. 15, 1999) <http.//www.backstage.nwf.org>.
76. James Cameron, WTO Opens Disputes to Private Voices, NAT'LLJ., Dec. 7, 1998, at B5.
77. Id.
78. The three NGO groups were: (1) The World Wide Fund for Nature, and the Foundation for
International Environmental Law and Development, (2) the Center for International Environmental Law, the
Center for Marine Conservation, the Environmental Foundation Ltd., the Mangrove Action Project, the Philippine
Ecological Network, Red Nacional de Accion Ecologica, and Sobrevivencia and (3) the Earth Island Institute, the
Humane Society, and the Sierra Club. Shrimp-Turtles, supra note 66, atl 79.
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sources were incompatible with the provisions of the DSU.79 Article 13(1) of the
DSU provides, in relevant part:
Each panel shall have the right to seek information and technical advice
from any individual or body which it deems appropriate. However, before
a panel seeks such information or advice from any individual or body
within the jurisdiction of a Member it shall inform the authorities of that
Member. A Member should respond promptly and fully to any request by
a panel for such information as the panel considers necessary and
appropriate.8°
The Panel in Shrimp-Turtles interpreted Article 13.2 to mean that additional
information (i.e., briefs) is appropriately submitted to a Panel only if the Panel
expressly solicits it.8'
The Appellate Body rejected the Panel's interpretation.82 It held that attaching
a brief or other material to the submission of either an appellant or appellee, no
matter how or where such material may have originated, renders that material at
least prima facie valid and an integral part of that participant's submission.83 The
Appellate Body admitted the amicus briefs submitted by the three groups of NGOs
as an appendix to the United States' submission, notwithstanding the fact that the
appended briefs contained legal arguments differing from those submitted by the
United States.
Under the Appellate Body holding, a Panel still retains the right to disregard or
reject an amicus brief filed by a private organization. The Panel does not, however,
have the right to disregard the brief solely on the grounds that it was not submitted
by a member. Thus, WTO Panels and Appellate Bodies retain the right, under the
decision in the Shrimp-Turtles case, to accept or reject information provided by
private parties. Information, in the form of amicus briefs from a private party, may
still be submitted to a WTO Panel or Appellate Body as an appendix to a member's
submission. Shrimp-Turtles also held that private parties may submit amicus briefs
directly to a Panel or Appellate Body.8 If a private party's amicus brief is expressly
adopted by a member to be part of that members' submission, however, a panel
would be under an obligation to consider its arguments.' Otherwise, private party
79. Shrimp-Turtles, supra note 66, at 8.
80. DSU, art. 13(1) (emphasis added).
81. Shrimp-Turtles, supra note 66, at 9.
82. See id. at 89.
83. Id.
84. The language of the Appellate Body decision has been interpreted to imply that any individual or
interest group can now submit an amicus brief directly to a WTO panel, although the panel would have the
discretion to disregard it. See Shrimp-Turtles, supra note 66; see also Cameron, supra note 76, at B5.
85. See Shrimp-Turtles, supra note 66, at 89; see also Cameron, supra note 76, at B5.
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access to the WTO, in the absence of a member's endorsement, remains
discretionary with the Panel or Appellate Body receiving the information.
E. The Consequences of NGO Access
There are many potential advantages inherent in the right of unsolicited NGO
amicus brief submissions to the WTO. Discussed above, democracy deficit is
perpetuated by a WTO system that strictly adheres to government-to-government
dispute resolution. One of the advantages to NGO brief submissions, therefore, is
the potential to reduce the amount of democracy deficit in the resolution of
international trade disputes. Private interests that may not be represented by the
interests of the private entity's state, may now be heard by the WTO. Greater access
to the governing body makes the WTO more accountable to private interests,
thereby reducing democracy deficit. Member states have represented the interests
of NGOs and multinational corporations throughout the history of GATT.
Generally, member states' willingness to bring or voice disputes on behalf of
corporations and NGOs has provided adequate representation of private interests.8 6
Take, for example, the EU-Bananas case. In that case, the United States agreed to
enter the dispute as a complaining party at the insistence of Chiquita Corporation,
a powerful, multinational companyY The United States also represented the
interests of several other U.S. banana-industry corporations who, likewise, were
injured by the EU-ACP arrangement.88 Thus, WTO member states often act as
agents for multinational corporation and NGO interests. A second potential
advantage to NGO brief submission, therefore, is that states may stop acting as
agents for private interests. This system is potentially more efficient and certainly
more democratic.
Frequently, however, the interests of states are concomitant with those of NGOs
or corporations. In this case, the availability of private party brief submission to the
WTO is of little consequence. As outlined in Shrimp-Turtles, a WTO Panel or
Appellate Body is obligated to receive private party amicus briefs that are attached
to a member's submission.89 Where the Shrimp-Turtles holding may be invaluable,
however, is in the case of member state reluctance to make an argument on behalf
of the private entity. NGO submission of briefs directly to the WTO, therefore,
ultimately improves the accountability and transparency of international trade
dispute settlement. Transparency in dispute settlement is promoted by insuring that
all arguments in a dispute are considered. Transparency can be improved if
corporations and NGOs know that their arguments and positions have a chance to
be considered during trade disputes. Increased transparency is thus promoted by a
86. See generally United States-Anti-Dumping Duty, supra note 3.
87. See generally Sekhri, supra note 34.
88. Id.
89. See Shrimp-Turtles, supra note 66.
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direct avenue for NGO brief submission to the WTO. This can improve the
efficiency of international trade for states, individuals, organizations and even the
environment.
Notwithstanding the "benefits" of direct brief submission by private parties,
there are also arguments to be made against such procedures. In his article
discussing private party participation at the WTO, James Cameron lists several
potential negative consequences to the right of private party access as determined
in the Shrimp-Turtles decision.90 First, Cameron explains that the United States
considers, on a case-by-case basis, whether to attach amicus briefs to its
submissions. He warns, however, that the effect of the Appellate Body's ruling in
the U.S. and probably other member countries will be to increase pressure on
member governments to attach NGO and corporate amicus briefs to its own WTO
submissions.9
Second, the decision leaves WTO Panels and the Appellate Body with the
discretion to accept or reject the arguments contained in amicus briefs unless such
information is expressly adopted by the member attaching the brief. This discretion,
however, could lead to aggressive lobbying efforts by private organizations to
influence a member embroiled in a trade dispute to expressly adopt the
organization's arguments.92 Moreover, private organizations may also turn their
energies toward lobbying other WTO members to join in a trade dispute as a third-
party participant. As a third-party participant, a member could effectively represent
the legal arguments of an organization. Lobbying efforts conducted by private
organizations could become burdensome and counterproductive to the point of
"clogging" a member's ability to represent national interests before the WTO. On
the other hand, although not to minimize its significance, the Shrimp-Turtles
decision itself does little to affect a private organization's ability to lobby either its
own national government or that of another member. Cameron simply warns that
the Shrimp-Turtles decision could accelerate the lobbying process.
Cameron's final warning further points out the dangers of excessive lobbying,
not to member governments, but to the WTO panels themselves. The Shrimp-
Turtles decision permits the direct submission of amicus briefs by an individual or
organization to a WTO panel. Even though the panel has the discretion to disregard
such arguments, the danger nevertheless exists that WTO panelists could be unduly
influenced by these lobbying efforts. Private organizations could, in this way,
influence a panel's decision by openly urging a panel to accept its arguments.
Although WTO panelists are otherwise shielded from lobbying efforts and are
strictly prohibited from ex parte communications, Cameron explains that the
"experience in Washington, D.C. suggests.., that creative and powerful NGOs and
90. See Cameron, supra note 76, at B5.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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other interest groups could pressure panelists or party and non-party WTO
Members by using a variety of tactics, such as public relations campaigns. '93 If the
Shrimp-Turtles decision leads to excessive lobbying and public relations campaigns
on the part of private organizations, the efficiency, transparency and reliability of
the WTO system could be compromised.
IV. PRIVATE PARTY ACCESS TO OTHER INTERNATIONAL
DISPUTE SEITrLEMENT FORA
Since the inception of the GATT, trade dispute settlement between members
has reflected the state-to-state nature of the treaty. Liberal theorists of international
relations will argue, however, that globalization undermines the utility of state-to-
state conflict resolution because the state's interests are increasingly a reflection of
the interests of individuals. 94 Both procedural holdings in the E. U-Bananas case and
the Shrimp-Turtles case support these liberal arguments. Specifically, the right of
WTO members to seek the representation of private counsel and the right of private
organizations to have their voices directly heard by a panel or Appellate Body are
convincing examples that international trade dispute settlement mechanisms in the
WTO are gravitating away from a historically state-to-state process.
Other international dispute settlement procedures do not hold the same
restrictions against individual and private participation. Indeed, other international
dispute settlement mechanisms, like those protecting international human rights,
were designed for the express purpose of providing access and remedy for
individuals and private entities. The International Centre for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID) and the EU are two international systems that, unlike
the WTO, recognize the right of private parties to bring suit against a state or other
national entity. Although, for comparative purposes, the structures and procedures
of the ICSID and the EU are quite different from those of the WTO, the important
consideration in this paper is the degree to which an international system
accomplishes its goals. Both the ICSID and the EU are designed to directly apply
to the actors operating within their systems. One may argue that the WTO's lack of
private access is a non-recognition of important actors operating in its system.
A. The International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
The availability of dispute settlement procedures for international investment
disputes stands in stark contrast to the lack of private access to international trade
dispute settlement methods at the WTO. The ICSID, established through the 1965
93. Id.
94. See G. Richard Shell, The Trade Stakeholders Model and Participation by Non-State Parties in the
WTO, 17 U. PA. J. INTL ECON. L. 359,367 (1996).
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Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals
of Other States, is a legal framework that protects and promotes the flow of foreign
investment between developed and developing countries.95 The ICSID also permits
private parties to participate with states in settling disputes and making policy. "The
ICSID permits private parties, mainly banks, to sue states and obtain binding
arbitration awards that the domestic courts of the defendant states are obligated by
treaty to enforce. 96 The ICSID's function is best summarized in Bruno's article:
ICSID is an organization closely associated with the World Bank... Like
the World Bank, the paramount objective of ICSID is to promote a climate
of mutual confidence between states and investors... [ICSID arbitration]
is intended to maintain a careful balance between the interests of investors
and those of Contracting States. The Washington Convention gives
investors direct access to an international forum and enables investors to
provide in an investment agreement that disputes will be decided under
rules of international law. In exchange, the Washington Convention
protects Contracting States from other forms of foreign international
litigation.., the investor cannot bring suit in a non-ICSID forum whether
in the investor's state or elsewhere.97
Unlike the WTO, the ICSID is accessible to states and private entities alike. The
ICSID's jurisdiction extends to "disputes between a Contracting State and a
national of another Contracting State arising directly out of an investment-related
agreement, provided both parties have consented in writing to submit such a dispute
to the Centre."98 In requiring consent to achieve jurisdiction, the ICSID does not
settle disputes directly; rather, it relies on Conciliation Commissions and arbitration
empowered under the Convention."
In an effort to balance the interests of all parties involved in a dispute
settlement procedure and thus to "depoliticize" the settlement of
investment disputes, [ICSID] Article 27 suspends the right of Contracting
States to exercise diplomatic protection of nationals who have consented
to an ICSID arbitration hearing. In addition, ICSID's governing body is an
Administrative Council comprised of one representative from each
95. Bruno, supra note 9, at 79.
96. Shell, supra note 94, at 372.
97. See Bruno, supra note 9, at 79-80 (citing Delaume, "ICSID Arbitration," in Lew, Contemporary
Problems in International Arbitration, (1986)) (emphasis supplied) (citations omitted).
98. Malcolm Rowat, Multilateral Approaches to Improving the Investment Climate of Developing
Countries: The Cases of ICSID and MIGA, 33 HARv. INT'L L. 103, 109 (1992). "Investment" in the ICSID
context has rendered 'jurisdiction over a wide range of activities, including construction contracts, licensing, and
concession agreements, as well as purely manufacturing activities." Id.
99. Id. at 107.
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participating state, with each representative entitled to cast one vote on
behalf of the state. Because of these equitable safeguards, ICSID has been
viewed as a more neutral body than . . . [other dispute settlement
entities].1°°
With direct access for individual investors, the ICSID maintains an acceptable
middle ground between the conflicting interests of host states and foreign investors,
as well as between those of capital exporting and capital importing countries.°The
ICSID effectively prevents some of the shortcomings of other, more traditional and
"outdated" international dispute settlement mechanisms; namely, it prevents
diplomatic protection, determination of nationality, and exclusive resort to local
remedies. ' 02 Despite relatively limited utilization, as compared to other dispute
resolution systems, the ICSID is considered a tremendous success in the field of
improving the flow of international investments as a vehicle for economic
development.
Although the ICSID is an autonomous organization, it has close ties with the
World Bank.'0 3 Staffing for the ICSID Secretariat is provided by the World Bank's
Legal Department, expenses of the Secretariat are financed out of the World Bank's
budget, and the Vice President and General Counsel of the World Bank have
consistently been elected to serve as ICSID's Secretary General.' 4 "The [World]
Bank's overriding consideration in creat[ing] ICSID was the belief that an
institution specially designed to facilitate the settlement of investment disputes
between governments and foreign investors could help to promote increased flows
of international investment."' 05 Once parties consent to arbitration under the ICSID
Convention, neither may unilaterally withdraw its consent.'06 All members of the
ICSID Convention must recognize and enforce ICSID arbitral awards.'0 7
Thus, the ICSID, with the backing and endorsement of the World Bank, is
accessible to private parties and governments alike. As the World Bank has
acknowledged, the ICSID was specifically conceived to promote increased flows
of international investment to both private foreign investors and governments.
Indeed, private investors in the form of individuals and corporations are responsible
for a considerable amount of foreign investment. As a forum of international
dispute resolution, the ICSID, unlike the WTO, acknowledges all actors operating
100. Id.
101. Bruno, supra note 9, at 99.
102. Id.
103. See The World Bank Group, About ICSID (visited Nov. 15, 1999) <http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/
about/about.htm>.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. To date, the ICSID Convention has been signed by 147 States. See The World Bank Group, ICSID
List of Contracting States (visited Nov. 15, 1999) <http:llwww.worldbank.orgicsid/constate/c.states-en.htm>.
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within its system. The ICSID applies equally to "all parties" who participate in the
field of international investment.
108
B. The European Union
One commentator has noted that "[o]f the existing models of international
dispute resolution, clearly the EU's system provides for the most individual
involvement. ' t 9 Through the exercise of direct effect, individuals are granted the
rights and standing to protect their interests. t 0 Another commentator has stated
that:
'The legal order created in the European Treaties established the EU court
system, which has significantly influenced the development of European
law." ' "This court system deals with disputes between Member States,
between Member States and EU institutions, between the institutions
themselves, between individuals and Member States, and between
individuals and institutions." 
1 2
In the EU, private actors have the opportunity to bring their cause of action to
an international tribunal, in this case, the European Court of Justice (ECJ). In
limited instances, the individual may bring a case directly to the ECJ.n 3 Private
parties may access the ECJ through the Court of First Instance (CF) under Article
173(4) of the EU Treaty: "any natural or legal person may... institute proceedings
against a decision addressed to that person or against a decision, which, although
in the form of a regulation or a decision addressed to another person, is of direct and
individual concern to the former."1 4 Direct CR access for private individuals is
limited to actions regarding the implementation of EU regulations and decisions.
15
A more common route for a case to be brought before the ECJ is by reference
from a European national court.116 "Article 169 of the EU Treaty gives the
Commission the sole right to file proceedings regarding the non-, or deficient,
108. "All parties" refers to the distinction between private and governmental actors. Of course, the ICSID
is limited to States and nationals of States that are members of the ICSID Convention.
109. Schneider, supra note 20, at 631.
110. "Direct effect" refers to those treaties that give private actors immediate rights and under which no
further domestic legislative action is necessary. Id. at 595-96 (noting that the rights under the Treaty of Rome are
"directly applicable," but that this phrase is the same as "direct effect"). Id.
111. The "EU Treaty," affectionately termed the Maastrict Treaty, is the Treaty on European Union, Feb.
7, 1992, OJ. (C 224) 1 (1992); see also N. Gal-Or, Private Party Direct Access: A Comparison of the NAFTA and
the EU Disciplines, 21 B.C. INT'L & COMP. 1, 10 (1998).
112. See Gal-Or, supra note 111, at 10 L.R.
113. Schneider, supra note 20,at 606-07.
114. EU Treaty, Article 173(4); see also Gal-Or, supra note 111, at 35.
115. Id.
116. Schneider, supra note 20, at 607.
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implementation of Community law by Member States."" 7 "Under Article 170,
Member States also have the right to file such proceedings."' 18 Both Articles 169
and 170 exclude the private party for purposes of direct litigation and
intervention. 19 Under Article 177, however, the private party may be represented
by the member State that files a preliminary reference, from its national court, with
the ECJ. 20 Parties to an action before a national court, and the member State in
which it is situated, both have the right to submit written and oral observations to
the ECJ independently.' Thus, both EU States and individuals participate in the
proceedings.
More specific to foreign trade claims, the EU dispute resolution system has
been described as a hybrid decision-making process:
The decision-making process in the EU for the bringing of foreign trade
claims is thus not a purely "intergovernmental" negotiation among the
respective member states and the European Commission over potentially
divergent national and EU interests. Rather, it is a dynamic, ad hoc, hybrid,
multi-tiered process in which private interests are deeply implicated. It is
multi-tiered because private interests work behind the scenes
simultaneously at the national and supranational levels with member state
and Commission representatives in order to profit from the removal of
.foreign trade barriers. It is ad hoc because private businesses coordinate
their positions among themselves within, through and between trade
associations, and form partnerships with EU public officials, on an ad hoc
basis. It is a hybrid because the process is neither purely intergovernmental
nor purely private.122
Regardless of the particular avenue for private party access, the EU's direct
effect enables a private individual to have its case heard by an international tribunal
without the aid of national legislation. The EU must provide access for its citizens
to challenge EU policies because of its function and aspirations as a European
"government." This helps prevent a denial of democracy. In this way, and unlike
the WTO, the EU is designed not only to accomplish the goals of its founders, but
also to listen to the complaints and interests of the most important actors within any
system of governance: private parties and individuals.
117. N. Gal-Or, supra note 111, at 34.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. G. Shaffer, Mechanisms for the Negotiation of International Trade Claims by Public Authorities on
Behalf of Private Enterprises in the European Union, 92 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 212,223 (1998).
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V. CONCLUSION
In theory, an international system that includes state, corporate, organizational
and individual actors and that relies solely on states to bring and enforce the laws
of the treaty is an incomplete system. Especially in the context of international
trade, where private individuals rather than states are the primary actors, one may
recognize the importance of individual access and the irony of WTO dispute
resolution. On the whole, however, it is argued that despite its shortcomings, the
GATr has been immensely successful in liberalizing international trade since its
inception.
23
Nevertheless, there are many "improvements" that can be made to the
GATrIWTO framework so that dispute resolution adequately accomplishes the
goals set forth for the treaty. The system is imperfect because of the large gap
between state and private interests, as discussed in this paper. The lack of standing
for private individuals to bring suit before the WTO means that either there are
many potential international trade dispute claims that are never resolved, or private
interests in matters already before the WTO are not heard.
Private counsel representation and NGO brief submission acknowledge that
WTO Panels and Appellate Bodies are realizing the efficacy of private interests in
international trade matters. In the context of private counsel representation, the
WTO acknowledges both the sovereignty of member states and the importance of
stretching trade representation beyond national boundaries. In the context of NGO
brief submissions, the WTO has recognized the value of non-state arguments in
trade disputes. The WTO has even permitted NGO brief submission directly to a
WTO Panel or Appellate Body. WTO tribunals nevertheless retain the power to
accept or reject any or all NGO arguments that are not expressly adopted by a
member state.
The WTO changes, with regard to these two issues, hardly improve the ability
of private individuals to bring their own international trade disputes before the
WTO without the aid of a member State. The resolutions of the two issues in this
paper, while significant, do not foretell further changes (other than superficial ones)
to private party access to the WTO. Indeed, in their procedural analyses, the
tribunals in both the EU-Bananas case and the Shrimp-Turtles case returned to the
force and effect of the GAT. The GATT is expressly a treaty between the
Contracting Parties, who are restricted to "governments. '1 24
123. See Bruno, supra note 9, at 155.
124. See GATr, Article XXXII & XXXIII.
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Proponents of a liberal trading order'25 maintain that[:]
[T]he WTO system should be viewed less as an international treaty than as
a new world trade "constitution." Under this trade "constitution," these
proponents assert that private parties should be granted trading rights so
that enterprises may act as "private attorneys general" in order to assure the
effectiveness of the WTO rules, just as is the case under the "dormant"
commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution and Article 30 of the Treaty of
Rome. These commentators contend that WTO rules should have direct
legal effect within the national jurisdictions of the WTO's contracting
parties so that businesses may enforce them.1
26
Thus, if private parties are to have a voice at the WTO, there must be structural
changes to the GATT itself. Perhaps the WTO could permit private parties to
litigate trade disputes with other member states in member states' national
tribunals. The resolution of such disputes could be appealed directly to a WTO
Panel. Such a procedure would not be out of line with the goals of the GAIT. This
procedure would also not be without many difficult logistical, procedural, and
jurisdictional problems. The structure and procedures of ICSID and the EU, while
different from the WTO, reflect a pattern that adheres to the purposes and needs of
their principal actors. The ICSID, designed to promote the flow of international
investment between governments and individuals, directly applies to all states who
consent to its jurisdiction and to the individuals governed by those states. Likewise,
the EU's system of dispute resolution, designed to enhance the accountability of
member states and EU institutions to private individuals, gives states, individuals
and institutions a venue for litigation. The WTO/GATT Charter does not, similarly,
reflect the interests of its principal actors. Perhaps it should. Although the
GATIFWTO has clearly progressed toward departing from a solely state-to-state
international dispute resolution mechanism, more structural changes are required
before case law can guarantee the right of private parties to have a voice at the
WTO.
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125. This is an individual that acknowledges the importance of private individual involvement.
126. Shaffer, supra note 122, at 223-24.
